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Abstract
Formal analysis is required to check the behavior of the system before
implementation of any safety critical system. As the complexity of software
increases, the need for reasoning about correct behavior becomes more promi-
nent. Algorithmic analysis of dierent programs is usually carried out in order
to prove their properties of execution. Application of formal method is being
considered necessary for modeling, verication, and development of any soft-
ware or hardware systems. In the formal verication of behavioral model, an
attempt has been made to formally describe a real-time system e.g., use of
Automated Teller Machine (ATM) in Banks. In this thesis, formal models of
ATM system are described using state-based languages such as, Z, B, and Alloy
as well as event-based language such as, Monterey Phoenix. Model checking
is being carried out by automated tools, viz. Z/EVES, Atelier B, and Alloy
Analyzer for Z, B, and Alloy specications respectively. Furthermore, a com-
parative analysis of dierent characteristics shown by varied formal approaches
has been presented in this thesis.
Software architecture plays an important role in the high level design of
a system in terms of components, connectors, and congurations. The main
building block of software architecture is an architectural style that provides
domain specic design semantics. In the analysis of complex architectural
style, an attempt has been made in our work to formalize one complex style
e.g., C2 (component and connector) using formal specication language Alloy.
For consistency checking of modeling notations, the model checker tool e.g., Al-
loy Analyzer is used. Alloy Analyzer automatically checks properties such as,
compatibility between components and connectors, satisability of predicates
over the architectural structure, and consistency of an architectural style. For
modeling and verication of C2 architectural style, one case study on Cruise
Control System has been considered. At the end of this study, performance
evaluation of dierent SAT solvers associated with Alloy Analyzer has been
performed in order to assess the quality.
Keywords: Formal methods, formal verication, model checking, Z, B, Al-
loy, Z/EVES, Atelier B, Alloy Analyzer, SAT, Monterey Phoenix, software
architecture, and architectural style.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Formal Methods
Embedded systems emphasize on reliable operation of a product having large
social importance. Hence, they need to be properly specied and veried before
development using certain formal methods. Formal methods are mathematical
approaches, supported by tools and techniques, for verifying essential proper-
ties of the desired software or hardware systems. Mathematical techniques and
formal logics enable users to specify and verify models of a system at any part of
the program life-cycle such as requirements specication, architectural design,
implementation, testing, maintenance, and evolution [1]. Formal methods are
useful for checking the quality parameters such as correctness, completeness,
consistency, traceability, and veriability of system requirements. A formal
model of a system suppresses implementation details during the design phase.
These models are also helpful in xing the conguration of architectural ele-
ments i.e., components and connectors for complex systems. Formal methods
are also useful for code verication. According to Hoare, [2] the use of formal
assertions in Microsoft are not for program proving, but for testing. An im-
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portant role of formal methods is in the maintenance of legacy code. So, for
the software development, formal methods are used to specify the semantic
relationships of UML (Unied Modeling Language) diagrams.
Software requirements present precisely and unambiguously using a collec-
tion of tools and techniques that can capture the abstract features of a system.
The use of a formal modeling languages reduce the ambiguity and ensure the
completeness and correctness of the specications. A Model checker does not
check programs, rather than it checks the properties of a model, which are high
level descriptions of a system. In order to check whether the modeled system
complies with the user requirements, it needs to verify and validate that par-
ticular model. Formal modeling is a task to convert a design document into a
formal document, which is checked by model checking tools.
Formal methods are mainly associated with three techniques such as formal
specication, renement, and formal verication. Formal specication is used
to uncover problems and ambiguities from the system requirements. Many
formal specication languages are available in the literature. Some of them
are used for sequential systems such as Z [3], B [4], VDM [5], Alloy [6] etc. and
others are used for parallel systems such as CSP [7], CPN [8], LOTOS [9], RSL
(RAISE Specication Language) [10], Promela [11] etc. For these specication
languages, tools such as, Z/EVES [12], Atelier B [13], VDMTools [14] [15],
Alloy Analyzer [16] etc. are used for sequential systems and PAT [17], CPNTool
[18], LOTOS tool [19], RSL tool [20], SPIN tool [21] etc. are used for parallel
systems respectively. The list of formal methods and associated attributes
being used for verifying proposed software or hardware are shown in Table 1.1.
These attributes are paradigm, formality, object oriented, concurrency, and
tool support. The details about these attributes are mentioned in chapter 4. It
is also felt necessary to rene the specication until it can be implemented via a
readily veriable steps. Renement is an integral part of developing, checking,
and verifying the specication. Formal verication is a process to prove or
2
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disprove the correctness of a system with respect to the formal specication or
property.
Table 1.1: Comparison of Formal Methods on the basis of associated Attributes
S. No. Methods Paradigm Formality Object Oriented Cuncurrency Tool Support
1 Z State Based Formal No No Yes
2 Object-Z State Based Formal Yes No Yes
3 Alloy State Based Formal Yes No Yes
4 B State Based Formal No No Yes
5 Event-B State Based Formal No No Yes
6 MP Event-Based Formal No Yes No
7 ASM State Based Formal Yes Yes Yes
8 SDL State Based Formal Yes Yes Yes
9 Action Systems State Based Formal No Yes No
10 CSP State Based Formal No Yes Yes
11 LOTOS Process Algebra Formal Yes Yes Yes
12 RAISE Process Algebra Formal Yes Yes Yes
13 Petri Nets State Based Formal No Yes Yes
14 VHDL State Based Semi-Formal No Yes Yes
1.1.1 Benets of Formal Methods
Formal methods are mainly used in complex and critical systems in order to
improve functional and non-functional requirements of a system. There are
many advantages of formal methods.
3
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 Formal methods force the System Analyst and Architect to think care-
fully about the specication of a system.
 Faults are uncovered that would be missed using informal specication.
 System properties and invariants are preserved by the use of formal
proofs.
 Formal methods are mainly used in early phases of the software devel-
opment life cycle; hence, they lead to reduce testing and maintenance
cost.
 Use of formal methods can improve non-functional requirements such as
eciency, complexity, scalability, adaptability, dependability etc. of a
system.
1.1.2 Application of Formal methods
Informal specication of a system needs to be documented and maintained very
carefully in order to manage a practical formal verication process. Formal
methods are used in several practical Applications.
 Automatic generation of design documents, code generation, and test
case generation.
 The largest application area of formal methods was transport, followed
by the nancial sector [1].
 Other major areas were defence, telecommunications, nuclear sector, con-
sumer electronics, embedded systems, and administration.
1.2 Model Checking
Model checking is a formal verication technique based on the exhaustive state
space exploration of a nite state machine (FSM). There are a large number of
model checkers available such as SPIN [21], PAT [17], SLAM [22], NuSMV [23],
TAPPAL [24] etc. for verication process. By model checking, important
4
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system properties like functional behavior, performance characteristic, timing
behavior, and consistency of internal structure are veried. Model checking
traces its roots to logic and theorem proving. The goal of providing con-
ceptual framework is to formalize the fundamental requirements and provide
algorithmic procedures for the analysis of logical requirements [25].
1.2.1 Model Checking Process
For verication process model checker considers the formal model of a system
and system's property in the form of logic as input. If property does not hold
good then the model checker generates counterexamples. The schematic view
of the model-checking process is shown in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Schematic view of the model-checking process
1.2.2 Application of Model Checking
Model checking is a well-known verication technique which is applied to sev-
eral practical applications :
5
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 Verication of hardware systems such as, device drives, chip sets, high
end processor verication etc.
 Verication of software.
 Verication of communication and security protocols.
 Consistency checking of reactive systems.
 The main objectives of model checking are analysis, hunting and avoid-
ance of bug.
1.3 Motivation
During the development of software architecture, the number of defects grows
exponentially with the number of interacting system components. When for-
malizing the parameters such as, concurrency and non-determinism, it is ob-
served that they are very hard to model using standard designing techniques
available in the literature. System's growing size and complexity, together
with the pressure of drastically reducing system development time make the
delivery of low-defect systems an enormously challenging and complex activ-
ity. Software is used to develop the process control of safety-critical systems
such as chemical plants, nuclear power plants, trac control and alert systems.
Defects in such systems can have disastrous consequences. Apart from these
issues there are certain other issues, which have motivated me to carry out
research work in the areas of formalization and model checking of software
architectural style because of the complexities associated with-
 Functionality issues i.e., growing in size and complexity of a system.
 Non-functional requirement issues such as, eciency, scalability, avail-
ability, reliability, safety, security etc.
 Functional requirement issues i.e., time-to-delivery and costs of project.
 Maintenance issues i.e., requirements changing rapidly over time.
6
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1.4 Objective
Due to the complexity of the present day system, software development process
shifted from conventional design techniques to architectural elements such as
components and connectors. Hence, it is essential to check the compatibility
of an architectural style before the implementation of a system. The objective
of the research work as follows:
 To formally verify a behavioral model of any real-time system, dierent
formal modeling languages such as Z, B, Alloy, and Monterey Phoenix
have been considered.
 For verication of Z, B, and Alloy specications, automated tools, viz.
Z/EVES, Atelier B, and Alloy Analyzer are used.
 The compatibility of an architectural style can be veried using proper
formal verication techniques such as reachability analysis, automated
theorem proving, and model checking etc.
 To formally verify a complex architectural style i.e., C2 (component and
connector) a case study has been considered.
 To evaluate the performance among dierent SAT solvers, a comparison
has been made.
1.5 Organization of Thesis
The research work carried out to meet the objective has been organized in the
following manner:
Chapter 2 : This chapter provides basic concepts about formal modeling
languages considered for formal specication of any real-time system. For
verication process dierent tools supported by these modeling languages have
been presented. In this chapter, a safety critical real-time system i.e., Cruise
Control System (CCS) is presented. In the last section of this chapter, an
7
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architectural style C2 (Component and Connector) and architectural elements
such as component, connector, port, and role are discussed.
Chapter 3 : This chapter provides insight on the state-of-art of various
techniques applied for formalization and model checking of real-time systems
and dierent architectural styles. The review has been done in two broad parts
with respect to the objectives. The rst part describes the formal specication
and formal verication of real-time system using dierent formal modeling
languages. The second part describes the modeling and verifying of dierent
architectural styles.
Chapter 4 : In this chapter, behavioral model of a real-time system is
formally specied using dierent formal modeling languages such as Z, B, Alloy,
and Monterey Phoenix. Subsequently, it presents the signicant information
about the eectiveness and weakness of these formal modeling languages as
well as the tools supported by these formal languages.
Chapter 5 : In this chapter, an architectural style C2 is modeled using
Alloy. For consistency checking of the formal notations, model generator Alloy
Analyzer is being used.
Chapter 6 : In this chapter, the work done is summarized, the contri-
butions are highlighted and suggestion for the future work has been discussed.
8
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Basic Concepts
2.1 Introduction
A number of formal specication methods have been proposed for the anal-
ysis and design of application software. To choose a particular specication
method, it depends on the character of the desired software product. This
chapter highlights the basic concepts about dierent specication languages
such as, Z, B, Alloy, Monterey phoenix as well as the tools associated with
these languages using an example of ATM system. The behavioral model of
ATM system is mentioned in the fourth chapter. At the end of this chapter,
an example of Cruise control system and a complex architectural style i.e., C2
(Component and Connector) is also explained.
2.2 Formal Modeling Language Z
The Z notation (ISO/IEC 13568 2002) is a formal specication language that
oers mathematical notations for the specication process [3]. It provides
precise semantics that remove ambiguities from specications and oers a po-
9
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tential for reasoning and automation. Z is an example of a state-based spec-
ication language. Z Language has been developed at Oxford University by
members of the Programming Research Group (PRG) within the Computing
Laboratory. Z is a typed language based on rst order predicate logic and set
theory. Z is popular especially in developing critical systems where the reduc-
tion of errors and quality of software is extremely important. It has undergone
international standardization under ISO/IEC JTC1/SC22.
2.2.1 Z Notation
The main building blocks of Z notation are basic types denition, axiomatic
denition, and schema denition. Figure 2.1 shows the basic type denition for
an ATM system. A basic type denition introduces one or more types which
are used to declare dierent variables used in Z specication. An example of
basic type denition is the introduction of CARD with many types such as
cardNo, acctNo, valid etc. An axiomatic denition is being used to describe
one or more global variables, and it optionally species a constraint on their
values. Figure 2.2 shows the axiomatic denition for an ATM system having
both declaration part as well as predicate part. The condition in the predicate
part should be satised throughout the specication.
CARD ::= cardNo j acctNo j issuingBank j valid
NAME ::= custName j bankName
ATMResponse ::= opSuccess j opFailed
STATUS ::= available j busy j idle
RECEIPT ::= receipt
Figure 2.1: Basic type denition using Z notation
In order to model an operation of any system, schema is being used in
the Z notation. A Z schema consists of a declaration and an optional list of
10
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predicates. Figure 2.3 presents Bank schema and ATM schema having only
declaration part.
minAmount : N
maxAmount : N
withdrawAmount : N
accountBalance : N
withdrawAmount  maxAmount
Figure 2.2: Axiomatic denition using Z notation
Bank
bankName : NAME
card : CARD
has : NAME ! CARD
balance : N
todayDate : DATE
ATM
balance : N
maxAmount : N
todayDate : DATE
Figure 2.3: Schema denition using Z notation
2.2.2 Tools Support for Z Language
Various tools for formatting, type-checking and aiding proofs in Z are available.
CADiZ [26] is a UNIX-based suite of tools for checking and typesetting Z
specications. Z Type Checker (ZTC) [27] and fuzz tool [28] also support Z
notation and type checking of Z specication. There is another tool named
Z/EVES [12]. Z/EVES is an interactive tool for checking and analyzing Z
specications. Z/EVES is also able to read entire les of specications that
have been previously prepared using LATEX markup. RoZ [29] (Pronounce
11
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as Rosette) automatically generates the Z schemas skeletons corresponding to
a UML class diagram.
2.3 Formal Modeling Language B
B was developed by Jean-Raymond Abrial, also took part in the creation of
the Z notation during the 1980s [4]. B notation is closely related to formal
methods Z and Vienna Development Method (VDM). B method has a strong
decomposition mechanism. The primary aim of decomposition in B is to obtain
a decomposition of proof. Formal verication of proof obligations ensures that
a specication is consistent throughout its renements [30]. Like Z and Alloy,
B method is also based on rst order predicate logic and set theory. The basic
building block of B language is the notion of an abstract machine. An abstract
machine is the specication of a B module, suitable for the construction of state
variables and values of which must always satisfy its invariant.
2.3.1 B Notation
An abstract machine is a component that denes dierent clauses such as,
data in the form of sets and constants, its properties, initializations and oper-
ations. Figure 2.4 shows the dierent clauses such as, SETS, CONSTANTS,
PROPERTIES, VARIABLES, INVARIANT, INITIALIZATION, and OPER-
ATIONS specied in an order of the example as Bank ATM. But the order of
these clauses is not xed. The clause SETS represents the list of deferred sets
used in the machine (ATM). CONSTANTS describe the type and properties of
formal scalar parameters. PROPERTIES clause shows the type and properties
of machine constants. VARIABLES represent a list of abstract and concrete
variables used in machine. INVARIANT also describes the type and proper-
ties of variables. INITIALIZATION clause is used to initialize the variables.
OPERATIONS clause list and dene some specic operations. In this clause
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entercard and enterpin operations are specied using mathematical logic.
MACHINE
ATM
SETS
ATMSTATE = fatmWaitCard ; atmWaitPin; atmWaitOptiong;
CONSTANTS
minWithdrawal ;maxWithdrawal
PROPERTIES
minWithdrawal : INT&maxWithdrawal : INT
VARIABLES
atmstate; atmcard
INVARIANT
balance : INT& atmstate : ATMSTATE
INITIALIZATION
balance := minWithdrawal jj atmstate := atmWaitCard
OPERATIONS
entercard = PRE atmstate = atmWaitCard
THEN IF atmcard = valid THEN atmstate := atmWaitPin
ELSE atmstate := atmErrorMSG END END;
enterpin = PRE atmstate = atmWaitPin
THEN atmstate := atmWaitOption END;
Figure 2.4: Abstract state machine representation using B notation
2.3.2 Tools Support for B Language
Two main commercial tools which support B language i.e., Atelier B [13] and
B-Toolkit [31] are used by researchers and developers. For method B, there
is a model checker tool, known as ProB [32], developed at the University
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of Southampton. The model checker ProB, includes an animator, which is
amenable to validate the simulated behavior of a specication. UML-B [30] is
a tool that translates UML class diagram and UML statechart diagram into
B notation. But this tool work under certain conditions. Atelier B proposes a
set of commands allowing [13]:
 Syntax and type checking of components.
 Automatic generation of proof obligation.
 Automatic demonstration of proof obligations.
 Translatable language checking.
 Translating into one of the following programming languages (C, C++,
ADA, HIA).
2.4 Formal Modeling Language Alloy
Alloy is a lightweight formal method for describing structural properties of a
system. Some researchers believe that the formal methods are emphasized on
full formalization of a specication or design [33]. According to them, com-
plete formalization of a complex system is a dicult and expensive task. But
nowadays, various lightweight formal methods, which emphasize partial spec-
ication and focused application, have been proposed. Alloy is an example
of this lightweight approach. Alloy oers declaration syntax compatible with
graphical object models, and a set-based formula syntax powerful enough to
express complex constraints. There are many other powerful formal methods
also available such as, Z, B, VDM, CSP, RSL, etc., but they are generally not
directly executable. Alloy is amenable to a fully automatic semantic analysis
that can provide checking of consequences, consistency, and simulated exe-
cution. Alloy specication is built from atoms and relations. An atom is a
primitive entity that is indivisible, immutable, and uninterpreted [34]. The
semantics of Alloy bridges the gap between Z and object models. Alloy is
14
Chapter 2 Basic Concepts
mainly designed to search for instances within nite scope. The main building
blocks of Alloy modeling language are: signature, eld, predicate, function,
fact, assertion, command and scope. A signature is a collection of elds. A
eld represents a relation between atoms. The signature can be represented
by a keyword sig.
2.4.1 Alloy Notation
Figure 2.5 shows the Alloy specication of ATM system having a module ATM
to split a model among several modules. A module in Alloy allows constraints
to be reused in dierent contexts. This specication has two abstract signa-
tures such as, ATM STATE and OPERATION. Abstract signature can not
generate instances. A signature ATM contains some elds for showing relations
with other signatures. These elds are associated with multiplicity keywords
such as, lone, one for representing dierent types of relationships.
module ATM
abstract sig ATM STATEfg
abstract sig OPERATION fg
sigATM f pin : lone Identier ;
card : lone Identier ;
state : oneATM STATE ;
balance : Identier   > one Int;
operation : OPERATION g
pred enterCard [atm; atm 0 : ATM ; cId : Identier ] f
atm:state = ATMWaitCard && atm 0:card = cId &&
atm 0:balance = atm:balance && atm 0:state = ATMWaitPin g
Figure 2.5: Alloy notation for ATM system
In Alloy, operations are specied using predicates. A predicate is a logical
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formula with declaration parameters. In Figure 2.5, enterCard operation is
specied using pre-state and post-state of ATM. In this specication, atm and
atm' are instances of ATM showing a state of ATM, before enterCard operation
and after enterCard operation respectively.
2.4.2 Tools Support for Alloy Language
Several research works have been carried out to the integration of semi-formal
specication languages (like UML) with formal specication Languages. UML-
2Alloy [35] is a tool for integrating UML and Alloy into a single tool. Using
UML2Alloy, the designer can take advantage of the positive aspects of each
modeling language. Alloy supports an automated tool called, Alloy Analyzer
[16] which analyzes the Alloy models.
Formal models written in Alloy language, are translated into satisabil-
ity problem using SAT solver [36]. After that SAT solvers are invoked to
exhaustively search for satisfying models or counterexamples. In Alloy, addi-
tional constraints can be added as assertion and they can be veried about its
satisability. If an assertion does not satisfy the Analyzer, it produces a coun-
terexample in the form of instances. In order to generate instances for given
specication, a predicate is used. If there is a requirement of any additional
constraints, those can be added using fact and assert keywords.
2.5 Modeling Language Monterey Phoenix
Monterey Phoenix (MP) helps to describe the structure of possible event traces
using event grammar rules and other logical constraints [37]. Schemas are in-
stances of behavior. Schema formalizes the software architecture on the basis of
behavioral models. The system is dened as a set of events also known as event
trace, with two basic relations such as precedence and inclusion [38]. Event
trace is formally specied using event grammars and other logical constraints
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organized into schemas. Phoenix Schema is based on the concept of event (ac-
tion) including time constraint and introduces an ordering relation for events.
In a system execution, two events may not be necessarily ordered. They may
even execute simultaneously. For Phoenix Schema, both relations (inclusion
and precedence) satisfy non-reexivity, transitivity, and non-communicative
properties. Ten number of axioms [37] may be used for ordering of events that
should hold for event traces.
1. P :: Q R ; denotes event traces.                                                         4. P :: [Q]; denotes an optional event Q.             
                 P                                                                                                P                      P          
                                                                                                                                                                                   or 
       Q                            R                                                                            Q 
2. P :: (Q | R) ; denotes an alternative events (Q or R). 
P                   P                                                                     5. P :: {Q, R}; denotes set of events Q  
            Or                                                                                            and R without an ordering. 
Q                   R                                                                                        P 
                                                                                                            
3. P :: (* Q *) ; denotes zero or more events (Q).                   Q                                R 
 
      P                                                                                6. P :: {* Q *} ; denotes zero or more                                
                                                                                                  events (Q) without an ordering.                     
                                                                                                                       P 
    Q             Q            Q                                                                
                                                                                                              Q               Q              Q 
 
Figure 2.6: Rules of ordering of events using IN and PRECEDES
Events are represented by small circles and arrows using two relations such
as inclusion (IN) and precedence (PRECEDES):
IN  !
PRECEDES =)
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2.5.1 Event Grammar Rules for Monterey Phoenix
For ordering of events, let us assume that there are three events i.e., P, Q,
and R. The rule P :: Q R; means that an event p of type P contains ordered
events q and r of types Q and R (q IN p, r IN p, and q PRECEDES r).
Figure 2.6 shows the rule of ordering of events using two relations (IN and
PRECEDES). For phoenix schema, tool is not ready by the developers for
industrial application. Auguston et al. [39] have proposed a model checker for
monetary phoenix based on PAT [17] verication framework.
2.6 Cruise Control System (CCS)
The CCS is an automatic electronic control system used in a car to assist the
driver for an automatic transmission [40]. Cruise controller is the main compo-
nent of CCS that provides automated control over the vehicle by maintaining
constant vehicle speed with the help of input from the driver and communica-
tion with other vehicles. UML class diagram of CCS is shown in Figure 2.7.
This diagram contains nine classes i.e., AxleSensor, EngineSensor, BrakeSen-
sor, GPS, WheelRevSensor, Clock, CruiseController, ThrottleActuator, and
GUI. In CCS, axle sensor is being connected to the axle that generates a xed
number of pulses per rotation of the axle. Engine sensor is being connected
to the engine generates signals when the engine is in on state and o state
respectively. Brake sensor connected to the pedal sends a signal when the
pedal is pressed or released. Global positioning system (GPS) is a navigation
satellite system that can provide speed and location of the vehicle. Wheel
revolution sensor generates signals when speed of the vehicle gets changed. All
sensor classes have its states at any particular time. On receiving clock's signal-
notication from the class Clock, the states of these sensor classes gets changed.
After changing their states, sensor classes send notication to CruiseController
class.
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Figure 2.7: Class diagram of Cruise Control System
Cruise controller is the main class of CCS that allows the driver of the vehi-
cle to maintain speed without pressing the accelerator pedal. Cruise controller
sets the desired speed to the currently measured speed and then attempts to
maintain the measured speed. When accelerator is pressed and the cruise con-
troller is on, the vehicle accelerates smoothly. Cruise controller can change the
position of the throttle. If the driver pushes the brake, the cruise controller
switches o immediately. There are two actuators, which are considered in
this class diagram such as, ThrottleActuator and GUI. Cruise controller pro-
vides the states of sensor classes to actuators on the basis of requirements.
GUI class is helpful for the driver to see navigation, fuel level, and speed of
the vehicle. For more detail about behavior of Cruise control system, C2 style
architecture is presented in chapter 5.
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2.7 Architectural Style C2
The goal of this thesis is formalization of architectural styles. Large number
of architectural styles are available in literature such as, client-server, virtual-
machine, object-oriented, pipe and lter etc. but these styles are not useful
for all types of application systems. In chapter 4, ATM system is designed
using object oriented style (class diagram), subsequently formalized using dif-
ferent formal methods. For complex heterogeneous system like Cruise control
system, simple architectural styles are not sucient. Hence, some complex
architectural styles are felt to be more helpful to explain the behavior of any
complex application systems. Accordingly it is observed that Component and
Connector (C2) style is suitable for these types of complex systems.
C2 is a message-based architectural style for developing exible and exten-
sible software system. It is based on layers of concurrent components linked
by connectors in accordance with a set of rules [41]. Communication among
components is done by implicit invocation. The principle of C2 style is to pro-
vide limited visibility among components. A component in a C2 style is only
aware of services provided by other components above it in the hierarchy. A
component is completely unaware of services provided by components beneath
it. In a C2 style, a component placed at the bottom layer utilizes the services
of components above it by sending a request message. Components at the
upper layer emits the notication messages, when they change their states. C2
connectors broadcast notication messages to every component and connector
placed at the bottom layer. Thus, notication messages are represented as
implicit invocation mechanisms, which enable several components to react to
a single component's state change [42].
Figure 2.8 shows the example of C2 style developed in a tool known as,
AcmeStudio. An architectural interchange language models an architectural
style by using AcmeStudio. This tool does not support C2 style. An event-
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Figure 2.8: An example of C2 style
based style is shown in Figure 2.8; as C2-style is much similar to an event-based
style. In this gure, there are seven components, two C2 connectors, and nine
links. Component6 and component7 send only request messages to upper layer
components, whereas component1, component2, and component3 broadcast
only notication messages to the lower layer components. Component4 and
component5 send request messages and broadcast notications to upper layer
components and lower layer components respectively. A software architecture
has four main elements such as component, connector, port, and role. These
elements are described below:
Component : A software component is an architectural element that
encapsulates processing and data in a system's architecture. It restricts access
to a subset of the system's functionality and/or data via an explicitly dened
interface. It can be deployed independently [43]. A software component has
a set of runtime interfaces, known as a port. The port allows the points of
interactions between the component and connector.
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Connector : In a complex and distributed heterogeneous environment,
interaction may become more important and challenging than the functionality
of the individual components. A software connector has the task of eecting
and regulating interactions among components. It also provides application-
independent interaction facilities. A connector has a set of roles that identies
the components and connectors in the interaction.
Port : It is not possible in current component models to deal separately
with an element of an interaction point when such an element is needed alone
for specifying a specic logic [44]. A port denes the points of interaction of
a component with its environment. Components with complex interfaces are
overloaded with many dierent ports.
Role : In software architecture, components cannot directly connect to
connectors. They require a suitable role in connector that are compatible with
a port in the component. A role helps to facilitate the interaction between
a connector and a component. A connector is composed of roles that are
connected to specic ports. The roles are used to specify interfaces of the
port, being used.
2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, important notations associated with dierent formal modeling
languages, a safety critical system, and a particular software architectural style
have been presented. For automatic verication process, a number of tools are
available in literature. The goal of this chapter is to provide fundamental
information about techniques and tools for the research work carried out.
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Literature Survey
3.1 Introduction
Eort given for software testing can be reduced by applying formal verica-
tion techniques from starting phase of software development process. There
are many formal specication languages available for the formalization of soft-
ware. The state-of-art of various techniques applied for formalization and
model checking of real-time systems and dierent architectural styles are men-
tioned in the following sections.
3.2 Formalization of Behavioral Models
The rst proposed work is a formalization of a behavioral model using state-
based and event-based approaches using a case study i.e., ATM system. It is a
comparative study, in order to assess the strength and weakness of dierent for-
mal methods. A number of literatures available in the area of formalization of
behavioral model and comparison among dierent formal modeling techniques.
Nami and Hassani [45] described properties and types of formal specica-
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tion languages such as, Z language, VDM, RSL and CSP in software engineer-
ing. They categorized modeling languages into model-oriented, constructive,
algebraic, process-model, hybrid, and logical. They addressed the benets and
barriers of these modeling languages. They did not describe about tool sup-
port for these specication languages. They categorized these specication
languages on the basis of associated properties.
Yusuf and Yusuf [46] have compared the properties of ve formal methods
i.e., Z language, UML, The B method, Petri Nets, and Action Systems. They
addressed their dierences by designing a particular part of the Automated
Banking Machine (ABM) using each method, and further compared these
methods by analyzing their strengths and weaknesses. For syntax checking
and theorem proving, generally tools are used but they did present verication
process.
Daniel Jackson [47] introduced a comparison of notations among Z, UML,
and Alloy. He compared the notations used in three modeling languages using
an example of family. According to his conclusion, Z and Alloy are formal
approaches whereas, UML is a semi-formal technique. UML is a graphical
approach whereas, Z and Alloy are textual languages. The notations of Alloy
are inspired from Z and UML. They did not address the tools associated with
these modeling languages.
Zhang et al. [39] developed an approach for modeling and verifying software
architectures using an event-based approach i.e., Monterey Phoenix (MP).
Firstly, they formalized the syntax and operational semantics using MP. Sec-
ondly, a dedicated model checker for MP is developed based on the PAT
verication framework. They modeled software architecture using Monterey
Phoenix but automatic verication process did not show. They have proposed
a tool for Monterey Phoenix but this tool is not ready for industrial application.
Habrias and Frappier [48] compare various techniques such as UML, Z,
TLA+, SAZ, B, OMT, VHDL, Estelle, SDL and LOTOS etc. They compared
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these formal methods related to a set of attributes, which described several
properties of specication methods. In their study evaluation parameter is not
properly dened.
Kumar and Goel [49] modeled some aspects of ATM system using Z no-
tation. Firstly, they described the conceptual and formal models of the ATM
system. For writing the Z schemas and other notations, they have used the Z
Word tool. There are many theorem provers such as Z/EVES, HOL-Z, Proof-
Power etc. available for specication language Z. But authors have used Z
Word tool that provides only syntax checking of the Z specication written in
Microsoft Word.
3.3 Model Checking of Software Architectural
Styles
Software architecture is helpful for the high level design of a system in terms of
components and connectors. The main building block of software architecture
is an architectural style that provides domain specic design semantics for a
particular system. Although many architectural description languages (ADLs)
are available in the literature for modeling notations to support architecture
based development. These ADLs lack proper tool support in terms of formal
modeling and visualization. Hence, formal methods are used for modeling and
verication of architectural styles. Lots of work has been done in formalization
and model checking of simple architectural styles using dierent architectural
description languages (ADLs) as well as formal modeling languages. Some of
them are discussed in this section.
Kim and Garlan [50] have mentioned about mapping of an architectural
style into a relational model. They expressed an architectural style using
formal modeling language Alloy which can be used for checking properties
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such as:
 Whether a style is consistent
 Whether a style satises some logical constraints over the architectural
structure
 Whether two styles are compatible for composition
 Whether one style renes another or not
They have proposed formal modeling techniques for simple architectural styles
such as client-server, pipe and lter, virtual machine etc.
Wong et al. [51] presented a technique to support the design and verication
of software architectural models using the model checker Alloy Analyzer. They
presented the use of the architecture style library in modeling and verifying
a complex system that utilizes multi-style structures. They have developed
formal notations for simple architectural style i.e., client-server style using
modeling language Alloy.
Heyman et al. [52] illustrated the need of formal modeling techniques for
the software architect who need to precisely ascertain the security properties
of their design models. They have proposed a technique that motivates an
architect to easily develop, secured architecture designs by assembling already
veried security pattern models. They have developed a formal model for
simple security design pattern.
Keznikl et al. [53] presented an approach for Automated Resolution of
Connector Architectures based on constraint Solving techniques (ARCAS).
They used a formal modeling language Alloy for describing a connector theory.
They employed a constraint solver to nd a suitable connector architecture as
a model of the theory. They exploited a propositional logic with relational
calculus for dening a connector theory.
Bertolino et al. [54] illustrated software architecture-based analysis, eval-
uation, and testing. In this paper authors reported those parameters that
consider the most relevant advances in the eld of architecture based test-
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ing and analysis over the years. This study is a state of art described about
analysis, evaluation, and testing processes.
Zhang et al. [55] described the formal syntax of the Wright architectural
description language together with its operational semantics in the Labeled
Transition System (LTS). They presented an architectural style library that
embodied commonly used architectural patterns to facilitate the modeling pro-
cess. They had considered the Teleservices and Remote Medical Care System
(TRMCS), as a case study. They have modeled only simple architectural styles
such as client-server, pipe-lter, publish-subscriber, and peer2peer by consid-
ering TRMCS as a case study.
Pahl et al. [56] presented an ontological approach for architectural style
modeling based on description logic as an abstract, meta-level modeling in-
strument. They introduced ontologies as a mechanism described and formally
dened architectural styles. They proposed a framework for style denition
and style combination. They used ontologies as a mechanism for describing
and formally dening architectural styles.
Hansen and Ingstrup [57] have presented an application of the Alloy mod-
eling language to model architectural change. They demonstrated that it is
possible to model architectural change in a relational, rst-order language us-
ing both a static and dynamic model of the architectural runtime structure
and architectural runtime change respectively.
Bagheri et al. [58] described the feasibility of automated computation of
architectural descriptions with an executable prototype developed in Alloy.
Firstly, they identied the behavior of architecture as an independent variable.
Subsequently a conceptual architecture considered to make this idea precise,
including a graphical notation showing how the key concepts relate to each
other has been explained. For modeling KWIC (key word in context), they
have considered many simple architectural styles such as, pipe-lter, object-
oriented, and implicit-invocation style.
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3.4 Conclusion
This chapter makes a thorough survey of formalization and model checking
of behavioral model and architectural styles. The emphasis is given mostly
on the formalization of dierent architectural styles such as pipe-lter, client-
server, publish-subscriber, peer2peer. Apart from these, many comparative
approaches also mentioned in this chapter. However, it could be seen that for-
malization of critical and complex systems is a challenging task. This provides
a motivation for selecting an appropriate style for the available application and
subsequently formalizing using suitable formal methods.
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Formal Verication of
Behavioral Model
4.1 Introduction
To specify requirements, formal methods are mathematical based techniques
for the specication, verication and development of a system. It plays an
important role for software developers in the analysis and design phase of
the software development life cycle. In this chapter, formal model of Bank
ATM [59] system using well known formal specication languages such as Z
[3], B [4], Alloy [6], and Monterey Phoenix [37] have been developed. For
verication of these models, tools such as, "Z/EVES" [12], "Atelier B" [13], and
"Alloy Analyzer" [16] [60] are used to verify the specications of ATM system
being developed using languages Z, B, and Alloy. Currently, for Monterey
Phoenix, literature does not provide any tool. Alloy Analyzer helps to make a
Phoenix Schema executable. Z, B, and Alloy are state based methods whereas,
Monterey Phoenix is an event based approach. Z, B, and Alloy are used for
sequential systems whereas, Monterey Phoenix is helpful for parallel systems.
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Alloy and B are inspired by Z which is more expressive than both Alloy and B
but it is intractable in nature. The stylized typography of Z makes it harder
to work. ATM system is an example of real-time system and its incorrect
functioning may lead to large scale economic imbalance.
To specify requirements using formal methods, an example of Automated
Teller Machine (ATM) [59] is being considered, whose primary function is to
withdraw cash, make an enquiry of balance, and transfer fund.
Figure 4.1: Statechart diagram of ATM system
The statechart diagram of the ATM system has been shown in Figure
4.1. Statechart diagram is used to model the dynamic behavior of a system.
It denes dierent states of an object during its lifetime. These states are
changed by events. Statechart diagrams are useful to model reactive systems
that respond to external or internal events. In Figure 4.1, the statechart
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diagram has many states such as wait for PIN, wait for an operation, processing
withdraw etc. as well as many events such as insert card, enter PIN, select
withdrawal etc. When any event occurs in any state then that state will change
to some other state.
4.2 Formal Specication using Z
Z specication of ATM system is based on the nite state machine (FSM)
representation. In Z specication, the main building blocks are basic type
denition, axiomatic denition, and schema notation. To formalize an ATM
system, it rst declares the main variables that are used in Z schema, such as
debit card related information, type of ATM response, date, and messages in
the form of output generated by ATM system. Basic type denition for the
ATM system is described in Figure 4.2.
[ATM ;CUSTOMER;Bank ]
CARD ::= cardNo j acctNo j issuingBank j valid
ATMResponse ::= opSuccess j opFailed
STATUS ::= available j busy
DATE ::= issueDate j expiryDate j todayDate
ERRORMessage ::= invalidePinNo j invalideCard j insucientBalance
Figure 4.2: Basic type denition of ATM using Z
For withdraw cash operation, the customer should be aware in advance
about dierent restrictions for withdrawal. Dierent banks provide certain
restrictions on minimum amount or maximum amount of withdrawal. Hence, it
needs to be specied. The axiomatic denitions of some important constraints
are given in Figure 4.3.
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minAmount : N; maxAmount : N
withdrawAmount : N; moneyInMachine : N
accountBalance : N; pinNo : N; maxTran : N
withdrawAmount  maxAmount
Figure 4.3: Axiomatic denition of ATM using Z
CardReader
card? : CARD ; date : DATE
status : STATUS ; message! : ERRORMessage
status = busy
date = expiryDate ) message! = invalideCard
Figure 4.4: CardReader schema using Z
Z schema has two parts i.e., declaration part and predicate part. The
Z schema CardReader has both declaration as well as predicate part that is
shown in Figure 4.4. The rst variable in the declaration part of the schema
CardReader is a card?, which represents input variable and the second variable
is message! which represents an output variable. In Z, the input variables are
represented by using \ ? " symbol and the output variable is represented by
using \ ' " symbol.
BalanceEnquiry and CashWithdraw schemas are represented in Figure 4.5
and Figure 4.6 respectively. In BalanceEnqury schema, ATM and Bank
denote that the state of schemas of ATM and Bank will not change after
completing BalanceEnqury operation. The variable moneyInMachine' and
accountBalance' represent the next state of variables moneyInMachine and
accountBalance by using \ ' " operator. In schema CashWithdraw, ATM
and Bank represent that after the withdrawal operation the state of ATM
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and the state of Bank both will change. Z schemas can be specied using
other schemas with the  and  symbols when specifying operations that
respectively change the state or leave the state unchanged. The operator 
is used for override operation. Override operator is used in CashWithdraw
schema in order to override the remaining balance in previous balance after
withdrawal operation.
BalanceEnquiry
ATM
Bank
response! : ATMResponse
accountBalance : N
receipt ! : RECEIPT
status : STATUS
status = busy
moneyInMachine 0 = moneyInMachine
accountBalance 0 = accountBalance
response! = opSuccess
receipt !:amount = accountBalance
status 0 = idle
Figure 4.5: BalanceEnquiry schema using Z
For syntax checking and theorem proving of Z specication, Z/EVES tool
has been considered. The whole declaration part checked by Z/EVES tool with
the help of type denition of specication. The whole predicate part proved
by using Z/EVES tool with the help of specied constraints. The output
generated by the Z/EVES tool is presented in Figure 4.7.
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CashWithdraw
ATM
Bank
acct? : ACCOUNT ; m? : N
balance : N
response! : ATMResponse
receipt ! : RECEIPT
status : STATUS
status = busy
balance 0 = balance  f(acct? 7! balance(acct) m?g
response! = opSuccess
receipt !:amount = m?
satus 0 = Idle
Figure 4.6: CashWithdraw schema using Z
Figure 4.7: Syntax and type checking using Z/EVES tool
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4.3 Formal Specication using B
B method is a complete formal method, which supports a large segment of
the software development life cycle such as specication, renement, and im-
plementation. B ensures renement steps and proofs, that the code satises
its specication. The main building block of B specication is an abstract
machine which is used to encapsulate state variables, initialization of these
variables, and values of which always satisfy its invariant (predicate). The be-
havioral aspect of this specication is specied in terms of initializations and
operations that may be used to access or modify this abstract state. In this
study, important states and operations of Bank ATM system using B notation
are specied and further rened.
ATM has been considered as a state machine having two sets namely ATM-
STATE and CARDSTATUS, and four constants that are represented in B spec-
ication of ATM. Also two types of variables, namely, ABSTRACT VARI-
ABLES and CONCRETE VARIABLES are considered to store the values.
It is required to specify invariants and initialize ABSTRACT VARIABLES
and CONCRETE VARIABLES. The rst operation is considered as enter-
card. The initial state of this operation is atmWaitCARD. If the card is valid
then ATM system requests for PIN (Personal Identication Number), other-
wise it displays an error message as atmErrorMSG. After verication of PIN,
ATM system displays set of options for dierent operations. In Figure 4.8,
the operations such as balanceEnquiry, withdrawCash, and transferFund are
specied in an abstract way. Further in the renement process, other states
may be specied.
In Figure 4.8, the important properties of ATM system are represented in
an abstract view. Now it has been rened as withdrawCash operation and
transferFund operation. In the renement process, some more variables and
invariants are considered those are shown in Figure 4.9. Two abstract variables
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have been proposed such as mapCard and mapBal.
MACHINE
ATM
SETS
ATMSTATE = fatmWaitCard ; atmWaitPin; remCard ; remCash; atmWaitAmount ;
atmWaitCardNo; atmErrorMSG; atmSuccessMSG; atmWaitOptiong;
CARDSTATUS = fvalid ; invalidg
CONSTANTS
minWithdrawal ;maxWithdrawal ;maxTransaction; constNo
PROPERTIES
constNo : INT&minWithdrawal : INT&maxWithdrawal : INT
&maxTransaction : INT&minWithdrawal < maxWithdrawal
CONCRETE VARIABLES
cr cardNo; r cardNo; balance; r balance
ABSTRACT VARIABLES
atmstate; atm card
INVARIANT
balance : INT & r balance : INT & cr cardNo : INT
& r cardNo : INT & atmstate : ATMSTATE & atm card : CARDSTATUS
INITIALIZATION
balance := minWithdrawal jj cr cardNo := constNo jj r balance := minWithdrawal
jj atm card := invalid jj atmstate := atmWaitCard jj r cardNo := constNo
OPERATIONS
entercard = PRE atmstate = atmWaitCard
THEN IF atmcard = valid THEN atmstate := atmWaitPin
ELSE atmstate := atmErrorMSG END END;
enterpin = PRE atmstate = atmWaitPin
THEN atmstate := atmWaitOption END;
balanceEnquiry = PRE atmstate = atmWaitOption
THEN atmstate := remCard END;
withdrawCash(amount) = PRE atmstate = atmWaitAmount & amount : INT
THEN IF amount  balance THEN atmstate := remCash
ELSE atmstate := atmErrorMSG END END;
transferFund(rCardNo; amount) =
PRE rCardNo = r cardNo & amount : INT & atmstate = atmWaitAmount
THEN IF amount  balance THEN atmstate := atmSuccessMSG
ELSE atmstate := atmErrorMSG END END END
Figure 4.8: Modeling of ATM system using B
For withdrawCash operation, the condition is that amount must be greater
than minimum withdrawal and amount must be less than maximum with-
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drawal. Also for fundtransfer operation the above pre-condition should be
satised. Figure 4.9 shows the renement of withdrawCash, and transferFund
operation.
REFINEMENT
ATM r1
REFINES
ATM
CONSTANTS
accNo
PROPERTIES
accNo : INT   > INT
CONCRETE VARIABLES
temp cr ; temp r
ABSTRACT VARIABLES
atmstate; atm card ;mapCard ;mapBal ; temp
INVARIANT
temp r : INT & temp cr : INT & mapCard : fcr cardNog > + > accNo
& temp = ran(mapCard) & mapBal : temp > + > fbalanceg
INITIALIZATION
mapCard := fg jj mapBal := fg jj temp := fg
OPERATIONS
withdrawCash(amount) = PRE atmstate = atmWaitAmount & amount : INT &
dom(mapBal) = ran(mapCard) & amount  minWithdrawal
& amount  maxWithdrawal
THEN IF amount  balance
THEN atmstate := remCash jj temp cr := balance jj
balance := temp cr   amount
ELSE atmstate := atmErrorMSG END END;
transferFund(rCardNo; amount) = PRE atmstate = atmWaitAmount & amount : INT
& dom(mapBal) = ran(mapCard) & amount  minWithdrawal
& amount  maxWithdrawal
THEN IF amount  balance
THEN atmstate := atmSuccessMSG jj temp cr := balance
jj balance := temp cr   amount jj temp r := r balance
jj r balance := temp r + amount
ELSE atmstate := atmErrorMSG END END END
Figure 4.9: Renement of withdraw cash and transfer fund operations
The verication and code generation process of B specication have done
37
Chapter 4 Formal Verication of Behavioral Model
using the tool Atelier B. Atelier B tool provides graphical user interface math-
ematical toolkit for writing B specication. Atelier B allows Syntax and type
checking of components, automatic generation of proof obligation, automatic
demonstration of proof obligations, translatable language checking, and trans-
lating specication in B into one of the programming languages such as C,
C++, ADA, HIA etc. Figure 4.10 shows the snapshot of activities such as
syntax checking and code generation of ATM system using the tool Atelier B.
Figure 4.10: Formal Verication of ATM system using Atelier B
4.4 Formal Specication using Alloy
Behavioral properties of the example under consideration i.e., Bank ATM Sys-
tem can also be expressed in terms of logical predicates which can be checked
by a tool named as, Alloy Analyzer. In this formal specication, consistency of
dierent states of ATM System can be checked. The Alloy specication of ATM
system is shown in Figure 4.11. In this specication two abstract signatures
i.e., ATM STATE and OPERATION have been considered. ATM STATE
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has some concrete states such as, ATMWaitCard, ATMWaitPin, ATMWait-
Inst, RemCard, and RemCash. Similarly, abstract signature OPERATION has
also few concrete operations such as, EnterCard, EnterPin, OutCard etc. In
this specication, the main signature is ATM having ve elds such as pin,
card, state, balance, and operation. A eld shows the relation of one atom (sig-
nature) with another. Alloy supports a multiplicity concept in relation. For
example one is a multiplicity key word which indicates that the ATM system
has exactly one state at any particular time.
module ATM
open util=integer as INT
sig Identierfg
abstract sig ATM STATEfg
one sig ATMWaitCard ; ATMWaitPin; ATMWaitInst ;
RemCard ; RemCash extends ATM STATEfg
abstract sig OPERATION fg
one sig EnterCard ; EnterPin; OutCard ; Cash extends OPERATION fg
sigATM fpin : lone Identier ;
card : lone Identier ; state : oneATM STATE ;
balance : Identier   > one Int; operation : OPERATION g
pred insertPin[atm; atm 0 : ATM ; pinId : Identier ] f
atm:state = ATMWaitPin && atm 0:pin = pinId
&& atm 0:balance = atm:balance &&
((atm:card = pinId && atm 0:state = ATMWaitInst) or
(atm:card ! = pinId && atm 0:state = RemCard)) g
pred show InsertPin[atm; atm 0 : ATM ; pinId : Identier ] f
insertPin[atm; atm 0; pinId ] g
Figure 4.11: Alloy model of ATM system
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There are certain constraints that a developer does not want to record them
as facts. If a developer wants to analyze the model with other constraints, and
also to check whether these constraints are related to some other constraints
or not. Predicate expressions are used to achieve all these. Predicate describes
a set of states and transitions, by using constraints among signatures and their
elds. Without using a predicate, instances cannot be generated for operation
except from counterexample. A predicate insertPin shown in Figure 4.11,
species the pre-state and post-state of an ATM system using instances atm
and atm' of ATM signature. Operation insertPin indicates that the pre-state
of ATM is ATMWaitPin and the post-state of ATM is ATMWaitInst, which
means ATM is waiting for other options. The specication for insert PIN
ensures that there will be no change in the balance after this operation.
pred balanceEnquiry [atm; atm 0 : ATM ; bal : Int] f
atm:state = ATMWaitInst && bal = (atm:pin):(atm:balance)
&& atm 0:balance = atm:balance && atm 0:state = RemCard g
pred showbe[atm; atm 0 : ATM ; bal : Int] f
balanceEnquiry [atm; atm 0; bal ] g
pred cashWithdraw [atm; atm 0 : ATM ; amount : Int] f
atm:state = ATMWaitInst && INT=gte[int(amount); 0]
&& (INT=gte[int((atm:pin):(atm:balance)); int(amount)] = >
(atm 0:balance = atm:balance ++atm:pin {> INT=sub[int(
(atm:pin):(atm:balance)); int(amount)]&&atm 0:state = RemCash)
else(atm 0:balance = atm:balance && atm 0:state = RemCard)) g
pred showWithdrawal [atm; atm 0 : ATM ; amount : Int] f
cashWithdraw [atm; atm 0; amount ] g
run showWithdrawal for 3
Figure 4.12: Alloy model of balance enquiry and withdrawal operations
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For the operations such as, make an enquiry of balance, withdraw cash, Al-
loy specication is present in Figure 4.12. In balanceEnquiry and cashWithdraw
operations, the pre-state is same as ATMWaitInst. But the post-state of both
operations is dierent i.e., RemCard and RemCash. In case of balanceEnquiry
operation, the amount of balance will not change after the operation. But in
case of cashWithdraw operation, the state of ATM in terms of balance will be
changeed after this operation. In the process of formal specication all the
states of a system are checked in terms of pre-state and post-state conditions.
Figure 4.13: Instances generated by Alloy Analyzer
In order to generate and visualize instances, the run command of the tool
i.e., of Alloy Analyzer is being executed. After clicking the show button in the
tool i.e., Alloy Analyzer, it generates instances according to the given scope
which is shown in Figure 4.13. In Alloy specication, only one predicate can
be executed at any particular time. In this Alloy model, many operations have
been specied but instances are generated only for withdrawal operation. An
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important fact about Alloy is that it is designed to search for instances within
a nite scope. The value of the scope in the Alloy specication represents
the maximum limit of number of instances for given signatures. When Alloy
searches for instances it will discard any relation that violates the constraint
of the specication.
4.5 Formal Modeling using Monterey Phoenix
Monterey Phoenix (MP) helps to describe the structure of possible event traces
using event grammar rules and other logical constraints. In this specication,
the behavior of ATM system is formalized using event grammar rules of Mon-
terey Phoenix. The main function of ATM system is to validate the card,
validate the pin number, makes an enquiry of balance, withdraw cash, and
transfer fund.
SCHEMA ATM Machine
ROOT USER :: (enterCard(cardVerfSucceed(enterPin
(pinVerfSucceed (enquiryBal j withdrawCash j
transferFund) j pinVerfFail)) j cardVerfFail));
ROOT ATM :: (readCard(validateCard(validCard(validatePin
(validPin(waitForOperation performOperation) j
inValidPin)) j InvalidCard)));
ROOT ATMDATABASE :: (ValidateCard j ValidatePin j checkBal);
enquiryBal :: displayBal ;
withdrawCash :: (checkBal(sucientBal(dispenseCash) j InsucientBal));
transferFund :: (checkBal(sucientBal(transferFund) j InsucientBal));
ATM, ATMDATABASE share all validateCard and validatePin;
Figure 4.14: Phoenix schema of ATM system
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These functions are specied in terms of ordering of events which shown in
Figure 4.14. The schema ATM Machine, formally describes a set of possible
interactions among USER, ATM, ATMDATABASE etc. Some events appear-
ing in the schema at left side marked as ROOT events. These types of events
never appear on the right hand side of the schema. In the formalization of
software architecture, ROOT events are used to describe the components and
connectors. In the schema ATM Machine, USER, ATM and ATMDATABASE
have been considered as ROOT event. Besides these ROOT events, some other
events are also available such as enterCard, cardVerf, enterPin, pinVerf, en-
quiryBal, witdrawCash, and transferFund etc.
USER 
enterPin 
cardVerfSucceed 
enterCard 
ATM 
pinVerfSucceed 
readPin validateCard 
withdrawCash 
ATMDATABASE 
readCard 
enquiryBal 
transferFund 
validatePin 
displayBal 
checkBal 
performOperation waitForOperation 
sufficientBal 
fundTransfer 
dispenseCash 
Figure 4.15: Event traces of ATM for ATM Machine schema
Phoenix schema also supports a predicate share all, which is dened as:
P ;Q share all R  fa : R j a IN Pg = fb : R j b IN Qg
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where P, Q are ROOT events and R is an event type. On the basis of
event rules presented in Figure 2.7, visualization of ATM Machine schema is
generated. An event traces generated from ATM Machine schema shows the
ordering of ROOT events as well as other events. The ordering of these events
presented in Figure 4.15.
For automatic visualization of these event traces, Alloy Analyzer can also
be used because a model transformation from Phoenix to Alloy is feasible. Vi-
sualizations can also be done using UML activity diagram and UML sequence
diagram. Phoenix models can be integrated into standard frameworks such
as SysML, DoDAF, UML etc. for providing the level of abstraction that are
useful for other models. Visualization of schema using event trace is helpful
for test driven development.
4.6 Comparison of Dierent Formal Methods
The objective of this work is to provide a qualitative comparison of the few for-
mal methods those are considered important for model based as well as event
based specication methods. Formal methods are dierent from programming
languages, because the syntax and semantics of specication languages are
more abstract than the syntax and semantics of programming languages. For-
mal models provide constructs to write specications of programming systems,
while programming languages provide constructs to write programs. As the
literature says, no single method can be truly applicable for all types of prob-
lems. Some methods such as Z, B, VDM etc. are used for sequential systems
whereas other methods such as Action Systems, CSP, LOTOS, Petri Nets etc.
are used for parallel systems.
Z language is a very powerful approach that provides a precise specica-
tion but it is intractable. Object-Z is a conservative extension of Z language.
Object-Z introduces the notions of class as well as modularity, a precise notion
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of interface. B and Alloy are based on Z, but they are having some extended
features. The primary aim of a decomposition in B is to obtain decomposition
of proof. B method is very useful for executable code generation that can also
be used as an abstract specication language similar to Z. It ensures renement
steps and proofs, that the code satises its specication.
Table 4.1: Comparison among Z, B, Alloy, and Monterey Phoenix
S. No. Attributes Z B Alloy Phoenix Schema
1. Paradigm state based state based state based event based
2. Formality formal formal formal formal
3. Tool Support yes yes yes no
4. Design to Spec. yes yes yes no
5. GUI Editor yes yes yes no
6. GUI Result no no yes no
7. Object Oriented no no yes no
8. Concurrency no no no yes
9. Executability no no yes no
10. Code Generation no yes no no
11. Test Driven no no yes yes
Alloy is a light weight, executable language that provides graphical results.
Inconsistency among dierent components can be easily detected by those
graphical results. The basic functions of Alloy are loading, compiling, and
analyzing the Alloy specication. Phoenix Schema is mainly used for formal
visualization of software architecture that shows the behavior of the system.
Components and connectors are considered as ROOT events in event grammar.
It is an event based method using two basic relations inclusion and precedes.
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To compare Z, B, Alloy, and Monterey Phoenix, a set of attributes have
been identied for performance analysis which compares the properties of the
dierent formal methods. These attributes are presented in Table 4.1. The
attributes are: paradigm, formality, tool support, GUI editor, GUI result,
object-oriented, concurrency, executability, code generation, design to formal
specication, and test driven frame work. For the attributes paradigm and tool
support, Z, B, and Alloy are state-based and support tool for syntax checking
and theorem proving whereas, Monterey Phoenix is event-based and it is not
supported by any tool. All these specication languages are formal. Z, B,
and Alloy supported by the GUI editor for editing and type checking, but
only Alloy is supported by a tool for simulation and GUI result generation.
Alloy is an object-oriented language that is helpful for test-driven development.
Monterey Phoenix can also be used for parallel systems. Formal method B is
also helpful for generating code from specications.
4.7 Conclusion
Behavioral models of any system are precise and abstract in nature which can
be useful to support rigorous analysis and verication of properties. These
models are also helpful to answer the questions of stakeholders which can lead
to provide more comprehensive descriptions of the system behavior. But these
behavioral models need to be formally veried using mathematical approaches.
This study presents signicant information about the eectiveness and weak-
ness of these formal modeling languages as well as tools supported by these
formal languages. Formal methods are cost eective techniques which are used
to reduce the defect rate of software. These formal methods for specication
and verication purposes have been considered to understand the merits of
each one.
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Model Checking of a Complex
Architectural Style C2
5.1 Introduction
The present day emphasis on xing software architecture from the very initial
phase of system analysis gives rise to formal verication of the particular ar-
chitectural style. Software architecture comprises of a set of principal design
decisions that deals with high-level structure of a system [61]. In the architec-
tural development process, design decisions are usually being represented in
terms of structure, behavior, interaction, and non-functional properties of the
system. An architectural style is an architectural design decisions to capture
knowledge of eective designs for achieving specied goals in a given develop-
ment context [56]. Styles provide a common semantics for a software architect
in order to make the design more easily understandable. Dierent architectural
styles are being used by software developers, such as client-server, virtual ma-
chine, pipe-and-lter, blackboard, rule-based, publish-subscriber, event-based,
peer-to-peer etc. for the development of dierent application systems. As
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the complexity of the system increases, large number of complex styles have
been introduced such as C2 (components and connectors), CORBA, REST
architecture etc.
To endorse architecture based development, formal modeling notations and
model checking tools are needed for verication of the particular style. A num-
ber of architectural description languages (ADLs) are also applied for mod-
eling and development of software architecture such as Aesop, C2SADEL,
ArTek, Darwin, Rapide, SADL, UniCon, Weaves, Wright etc. [62]. These
ADLs support mathematical notations and tools for modeling dierent archi-
tectural styles and architectural patterns. For example Rapide [63] is being
used to model component interface and external behavior of a system, whereas
Wright [64] is used to model the architectural element i.e., connector. The
tools supported by the ADLs have certain limitations in terms of modeling,
visualization, platform support, and formal verication. A number of complex
styles have also been introduced for modeling and visualization of complex and
heterogeneous systems. The ADLs are not sucient for modeling and analyz-
ing complex styles. These complex styles provide a semi-formal notation for
modeling of complex systems. Hence, formal methods are being considered for
modeling, renement, and formal verication of software architecture. In the
process of formal modeling, analysis conrms the consistency of the requested
conguration with respect to a particular style. A number of analysis tech-
niques are available for testing, model checking, and evaluating non-functional
properties based on the architectural styles. Among them, model checking is a
verication technique, which is used to verify whether an architectural model
conforms to the expected requirements.
The goal of this study is to analyze one of the complex architectural style
i.e., C2 [61] using formal modeling language Alloy [6]. A case study on safety
critical system i.e., Cruise Control System (CCS) [40] has been considered
for designing the architecture in a particular style i.e., C2. Subsequently,
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Alloy notations of C2 style are analyzed using the model generator Alloy An-
alyzer [16]. A number of formal models have been proposed for simple styles
such as, client-server, publish-subscriber, pipe and lter, event-based etc. It
is observed that more rigorous study needs to be carried out for formalization
of complex styles such as, C2. ACME [65] is an architectural interchange lan-
guage used to model a system using dierent simple architectural styles such as
call-return, data-ow, event-based, and repository. It supports mapping of ar-
chitectural specications from one ADL to another, but ACME cannot model
systems in C2 style. Generally C2SADEL (Software Architecture Description
and Evolution Language for C2-style) is used to model C2-style. The tool
known as DRADEL (Development of Robust Architectures using a Descrip-
tion and Evolution Language) [66] supported by C2SADEL provides textual
and graphical modeling as well as skeleton generation; but this tool is not
sucient for simulation and formal verication. Presently, systems are run-
ning in a distributed, heterogeneous environment and software components of
a system are written in dierent languages. Hence, the software components
should follow the principle of substrate independence. The C2-style provides
a large number of benets such as, substrate independence, accommodating
heterogeneity, support for product lines [67], ability to design in MVC (Model
View Controller) pattern, and support for distributed applications [68,69].
5.2 Application of C2 Style on a Case Study
To explain the application of C2 style, a case study i.e., Cruise Control System
(CCS) has been taken. CCS is a safety critical real-time system typically aims
to increase the passenger safety during automatic transmission of the vehicle.
An architectural style C2 is considered to be suitable for structuring embedded
control applications. The architecture of Cruise control system in C2-style has
been developed and shown in Figure 5.1. The components in this style are
49
Chapter 5 Model Checking of a Complex Architectural Style C2
organized in a layered structure. In this example, there are ve sensors at
the top layer of the CCS. The Global positioning system (GPS) senses the
location and time information. The axle sensor senses the number of pulses
per rotation of the axle. The engine sensor senses signals when the engine
switches on and o. The brake sensor senses signals when the brake is pressed
and when it is released. The wheel revolution sensor senses the number of
revolutions of the wheel. The component clock generates a pulse when sensors
change their states. There is a facility of implicit feedback in such applications
via the external environment.
Figure 5.1: Cruise Control System in C2 architectural style
At the next top layer, there are four components available such as GPS
artist, axle artist, engine artist, and brake artist for receiving notications
broadcast from sensors. These components are used to handle information
broadcast from dierent sensors present at the top layer. The artist compo-
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nents receive notications of dierent sensor's states change, causing them to
update their depictions. Artist components maintain the state of a set of ab-
stract graphical objects that, when modied, send state change notications
in the hope that a lower level graphics component will render them on GUI.
The cruise controller is the main component that takes data from upper layer
components to perform computations. The function of this component is to
maintain the speed of a car without interference of user. There is a connection
between sensor and controller for receiving notication directly from wheel
revolution sensor to cruise controller in order to calculate speed and compare
it with the desired speed. Cruise controller requests for data from sensors to
perform computations. By notication messages, sensors broadcast data to
it. After performing computation, cruise controller broadcasts the calculated
values to dierent actuators i.e., throttle actuator and GUI. The throttle ac-
tuator sends request message for the required data and listens to the cruise
controller for notications. In C2-style, components are independent, concur-
rent message generators and/or consumers. Whereas connectors are message
routers that may lter, translate, and broadcast messages such as requests and
notications [70].
5.3 Representing C2 Style of Cruise Control
System using Alloy
Specifying a model of software or hardware system using Alloy has several
advantages. Firstly, presenting these formal model in an executable form en-
sures that model has unambiguous and testable semantics. Secondly, Alloy
visualizes a model of unbounded size and later species a size in a bounded
form when verifying properties. Automated tool Alloy Analyzer translates
high-level, declarative, relational expression of the formal model into a SAT
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instance that can be solved by SAT solver. Alloy is a declarative language
based on rst order predicate logic. To make the explanation more precise,
formal modeling language Alloy is used for specifying essential properties of
the cruise control system represented in C2-style. Behavioral properties of this
system can be expressed as a form of logical predicates which can be checked
by using Alloy Analyzer.
module Cruise Control System
enum FuelLevel fLOW ; HIGH g
enum Speed fLowSpeed ; ConstSpeed ; HighSpeedg
enum Brake fON ; OFFg
enum Accelerator fPushed ; UnPushedg
sig Notication extends Port fg
sig Notier extends Role fg
sig Request extends Port fg
sig Requester extends Role fg
abstract sig CruiseControlSystem f comps : set Component ;
conns : set Connector ; c2cons : set C2Connector g
sig Component f ports : set Port g
sig Connector f roles : set Role; attach : Role one  > one Port g
sig C2Connector f c2port : set Port g
sig Port f component : one Component ;
owner : one (Component + C2Connector) g
sig Role f connector : one Connector ;
owner : one Connector ; attachTo : lone Port g
Figure 5.2: Alloy specication of architectural elements
52
Chapter 5 Model Checking of a Complex Architectural Style C2
Figure 5.2 shows, Alloy specication of cruise control system having a mod-
ule Cruise Control System to split a model among several modules. A module
in Alloy, allows constraints to be reused in dierent contexts. There are four
enumerations such as, FuelLevel, Speed, Brake, and Accelerator which have
been considered in this case study. Like a signature, enumeration can also
contain a set of atoms. In the process of analysis, Alloy Analyzer selects all
instances for the given scope. Therefore the number of atoms become very
large that an explicit enumeration would be infeasible. Alloy Analyzer uses
pruning techniques in order to rule out whole sets of atoms at once.
In Figure 5.2, rst enumeration FuelLevel is used to specify fuel level of
engine. Enumerations Speed, Brake, and Accelerator are used to indicate the
status of speed (LowSpeed or ConstSpeed or HighSpeed), state of brake (ON
or OFF), and state of accelerator (Pushed or UnPushed) respectively. In this
model, the rst four signatures such as Notication, Notier, Request, and Re-
quester are being considered for communication among the components using
message passing. In C2-style architecture, message passing is only done by
request and notication messages. The next signature is CruiseControlSystem
which represents the whole system in terms of components, connectors, and
c2-connectors. There may be a large number of components and connectors
in a system. Each component has a set of ports to connect with dierent con-
nectors. Similarly each connector has a set of roles to connect with the ports
of a component. A port and a role is owned by a single component and a
single connector respectively. The eld owner in the port and role signatures
indicates that each role and each port have single owner.
In C2 style architecture, for the cruise control system ve sensors such
as GPS, BrakeSensor, AxleSensor, EngineSensor, and WheelRevolutionSen-
sor have been considered as components which are shown in Figure 5.3. These
components are placed at the top layer in hierarchy. Hence, they generate only
notication messages and receive request messages. Signature GPS has two
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elds such as specifygpsN and sendG. First eld indicates that GPS compo-
nent species a number of notications for other components which are placed
into bottom layers. Second eld indicates that notications are received by
GPSArtist component.
abstract sig Sensor extends Component fg
one sig GPS extends Sensor f
specifygpsN : set Notication;
sendG : Notication  > GPSArtist g
one sig AxleSensor extends Sensor f
specifyaxleN : set Notication;
sendA : Notication  > AxleArtist ; senseA : Accelerator g
one sig EngineSensor extends Sensor f
specifyengineN : set Notication;
sendE : Notication  > EngineArtist ; senseE : FuelLevel g
one sig BrakeSensor extends Sensor f
specifybrakeN : set Notication;
sendB : Notication  > BrakeArtist ; senseB : Brake g
one sig WheelRevolutionSensor extends Sensor f
specifyWRSN : set Notication;
sendW : Notication  > EngineArtist ; senseW : Speed g
Figure 5.3: Alloy specication of sensor components
AxleSensor component has three elds such as specifyengineN, sendE, and
senseE. First two elds work same as in GPS component whereas, third eld
senseE indicates the fuel level. BrakeSensor component also has three elds
such as specifybrakeN, sendB, and senseB. Third eld senseB is used to indicate
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the status of brake. WheelRevolutionSensor component has three elds such
as specifyWRSN, sendW, and senseW. The eld senseW indicates the speed
of a vehicle.
abstract sig Depiction fg
sig Artist extends Component fg
abstract sig Controller extends Component fg
abstract sig Actuator extends Component fg
sig GPSArtist f specifyGAR : set Request ;
specifyGAN : set Notication;
update : Depiction; sendRequest : GPS ;
broadcastNoti : CruiseController + GUI g
sig AxleArtist f specifyAAR : set Request ;
specifyAAN : set Notication;
update : Depiction; sendRequest : AxleSensor ;
broadcastNoti : CruiseController + GUI g
sig EngineArtist f specifyEAR : set Request ;
specifyEAN : set Notication;
update : Depiction; sendRequest : EngineSensor ;
broadcastNoti : CruiseController + GUI g
sig BrakeArtist f specifyBAR : set Request ;
specifyBAN : set Notication;
update : Depiction; sendRequest : EngineArtist ;
broadcastNoti : CruiseController + GUI g
Figure 5.4: Alloy specication of artist components
In Figure 5.4, there are four artist components such asGPSArtis, AxleArtist,
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EngineArtist, and BrakeArtist for maintaining the state of abstract graphical
objects. These artist components receive notication messages of sensor-state
changes, causing them to update their depiction. GPSArtist component has
ve elds such as specifyGAR, specifyGAN, update, sendRequest, broadcastNo-
ti. The rst eld specifyGAR represents set of request messages for top layer
components. Second eld specifyGAN represents set of notication messages
for bottom layer components. Third eld update indicates the state changed of
sensor component in the form of depiction. In architectural style C2, a compo-
nent has all essential information about upper layer component, whereas it has
no information about bottom layer components. Hence, in this example artist
components send request messages to a specic upper layer component and
broadcast notications to all components placed at the layer below it, from
that component's layer. Fourth eld sendRequest indicates request messages
sent from this artist component to only GPS component. Whereas broad-
castNoti eld represents notication messages sent from this component to
controller and actuator components. Similarly other artist components also
have ve elds for showing relationship with other components.
one sig GUI ; ThrottleActuator extends Actuator
f specifyAReq : set Request g
one sig CruiseController extends Controller
f specifyCN : set Notication specifyCR : set Request g
f Sensor = GPS + BrakeSensor + AxleSensor + EngineSensor +
WheelRevolutionSensor
Actuator = GUI + ThrottleActuator g
Figure 5.5: Alloy specication of actuators and controller components
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The cruise controller is the main component in this architecture placed at
the middle layer. Hence, it sends and broadcasts both requests and notica-
tions to the upper layer components and lower layer components respectively.
This component has two elds such as specifyCN and specifyCR used for rep-
resenting a set of notications and requests respectively, which are shown in
Figure 5.5. C2-style of CCS has two actuators such as GUI and ThrottleActua-
tor for receiving data, sent from upper layer components. These actuators are
only responsible for specifying request messages, because in C2 style, bottom
layer components send only request messages to upper layer components. In
Alloy notation, ' + ' operator is used for the union operation. Hence, sensor
shows the union of all sensors and actuator shows the union of all actuators
those are used in this style.
5.4 Analysis of Dynamic Behavior of C2 Style
In modeling language Alloy analysis is a form of constraint solving. Analysis
encourages the architect, by giving concrete examples that reinforce intuition
and suggest new scenarios. By adding fact statements, checking assertions,
and executing a predicate, the analysis problem can be reduced. A fact is a
logical constraint that should always hold good. In this model many facts have
been specied. An Alloy model can have any number of facts. In Figure 5.6,
PortRoleOwner fact has a constraint which indicates that if a port is present
in the component, it means that this port is owned by the component and
the component is the owner of this port. Similarly, if a role is present in the
connector, it means this role is owned by the connector and the connector is
the owner of this role. In the rst fact, name is given but in second fact name
is not dened. In Alloy, fact name is optional. The second fact indicates that
if some roles are related to some ports then these roles should be specied by
some connectors.
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fact PortRoleOwner
f ports = component && roles = connector g
fact
f all con1; con2 : Connector j some role1; role2 : Role j
some port1; port2 : Port j role1  > port1 in con1:attach
&& role2  > port2 in con2:attach g
Figure 5.6: Analysis for port and role
assert No comp comp connectionf all role1; role2 : Role j
all port1; port2 : Port j some comp1; comp2 : Component
j connectRolePort [role1; port1] && connectRolePort [role2; port2]
&& owner [port1] = comp1 => owner [port2] ! = comp2 g
Figure 5.7: Analysis of architectural elements attachment
In C2 style architecture two components cannot directly be connected.
If one component wants to communicate with other components, it should
be connected through a C2-connector. C2-connector is not a simple con-
nector it is a combination of more than one simple connectors. Hence it
can be viewed that C2-connector acts as a component having set of ports
to connect with simple connector having set of roles. In Figure 5.7, asser-
tion No comp comp connection, checks that, if some roles are attached with
other some ports and the rst port owned by any component and also the
second port is owned by any another component, Alloy Analyzer generates
counterexamples.
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There are certain constraints that a developer does not want to record
them as facts. If a developer wants to analyze the model with other con-
straints, and also to check whether these constraints are related to some other
constraints or not, predicate expressions are used for this purpose. A pred-
icate is a logical formula with declaration parameters. Predicate describes a
set of states and transitions, by using constraints among signatures and their
elds. Without using predicate, instances cannot be generated for operation
except from counterexample. Figure 5.8 represents two predicates such as con-
nectRolePort and connectCompC2Conn to specify port-role connection and
component-c2connector attachment operations. Predicate, connectRolePort is
used for a port and role, returning true if they are directly connected. In sec-
ond predicate, constraints are added to connect component and c2-connector.
The keyword disj is used to restrict the bindings and include ones in which
the bound variables are disjoint from one another. In this code, disj indicates
that between two roles only one is used. In this Alloy model, connectRolePort
predicate is used, because predicates in Alloy act as built-in functions and it
can be easily used by other predicates.
pred connectRolePort [role : Role; port : Port ]
f role   > port in Connector :attach g
pred connectCompC2Conn [comp : Component ; c2con : C2Connector ]
f some role1; role2 : Role j some port1; port2 : Port j
disj[role1; role2] && connectRolePort [role1; port1]
&& owner [port1] = comp && connectRolePort [role2; port2]
&& owner [port2] = c2con && owner [role1] = owner [role2] g
Figure 5.8: Alloy specication of port-role attachment
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For cruise control system some constraints are usually added in the form of
facts. In Figure 5.9, the fact axle sensor Notication ensures that if speed of
vehicle is high and accelerator is not pushed then axle sensor component sends
notication message to artist component. Similarly, engine sensor Notication
fact ensures that if the value of speed is low-speed and fuel-level is also low, then
engine sensor component broadcast notication messages to artist component.
fact axle sensor Notication
f all wrs : WheelRevolutionSensor ; axle : AxleSensor j
some n : Notication; a : AxleArtist j
wsr :senseW = HighSpeed && axle:senseA = UnPushed
implies axle:sendA in n   > a g
fact engine sensor Notication
f all wsr : WheelRevolutionSensor ; engine : EngineSensor
j some n : Notication; e : EngineArtist j
wsr :senseW = LowSpeed && engine:senseE = LOW
implies engine:sendE in n   > e g
Figure 5.9: Consistency checking of Cruise Control System
In Figure 5.10, Alloy model uses Contain signature to restrict the model
to generate only one system instance. The predicate type-denition species
the denition of architectural elements and their types. Keyword univ is an
unary operator represented as universal set. C2 Style Consistency Checking
predicate species the type denition of Notication and Request signatures.
In this model, Notication and Request are considered as port and Notier
and Requester are considered as role. First constraint considers Contain as
a Notication attached by a Notier (it is a type of role). Similarly, in next
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constraint Contain is considered as Request attached by a Requester. Other
two constraints are inversely related to rst two constraints. Third constraint
considered Contain as a role (Notier) to attach with the port Notication. In
this constraint, it is specied that the number of link between a role (Notier)
and a port (Notication) should be one. Fourth constraint is similar to third
constraint for port Request and role Requester.
one sig Contain extendsCruiseControlSystem fg
pred TypeDenition [archElement : univ;
elementType : set univ]
f archElement in elementType g
pred C2Style Consistency Checking []
f allContain : Notication j
(all role : Contain:attachTo j TypeDenition[role;Notier ])
allContain : Request j (all role : self :attachTo j
TypeDenition[role; Requester ]) allContain : Notier j
(#(Contain:attachTo) = 1) &&
(all port : Contain:attachTo j TypeDenition[port ; Notication])
allContain : Requester j (#(Contain:attachTo) = 1) &&
(all port : Contain:attachTo j TypeDenition[port ; Request ])
g
run C2Style Consistency Checking for 3
Figure 5.10: Consistency checking of C2 style
In order to generate and visualize instances, execution of the run command
is done by clicking the execute button. After nishing execution, Alloy analyzer
indicates that it has found instances, which can be visualized by clicking on
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Figure 5.11: Instances generated by Alloy Analyzer
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the show button. On clicking show button in Alloy Analyzer, it generates
instances according to given scope. Operation C2 Style Consistency Checking
is visualized for scope value three, which means that Alloy Analyzer generates
at most three instances of each atoms.
The pictorial representation of this predicate is shown in Figure 5.11. This
gure shows dierent objects as enumerations, signatures, and connections
between these signatures representing a relation. It is possible to increase the
number of instances by using a scope in the run command. If scope is not
dened in the run command, by default, Alloy Analyzer assumes the value of
scope as three. As literature says, if the value of scope is more than seven, then
Alloy Analyzer generates all possible types of relations among given objects.
There is a button next in Alloy Analyzer which shows all possible types of
relations among the objects. Figure 5.12 shows some of the types used in our
expression together with the relations between these types. This meta model
provides conceptual map of our model.
5.5 Performance Evaluation among Dierent
SAT Solvers
To investigate the scalability of the analysis, the consistency on Alloy speci-
cation of cruise control system considering problem size (scope) from 2 to 12
has been checked. For the performance evaluation, system conguration is In-
tel(R) Core(TM) i5-2400 CPU @ 3.10 GHz, 2.00 GB (1.88 GB usable), 32-bit
Windows 7 operating system. Execution is carried out using Alloy Analyzer
4.2, build date: 2012-04-20 10:05 EDT. During execution process SAT solver is
SAT4J where maximum stack to use was 8192k and maximum memory to use
was 768M. For problem size 2 to 10 above details are used; when the execution
performed for problem size 12, Alloy Analyzer generates error message related
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Figure 5.12: Meta model of Alloy specication generated by Alloy Analyzer
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to memory used. Hence, for problem size 12, maximum memory 1024M is used.
The performance result for dierent bound range (from 2 to 12) is shown in
Figure 5.13. As shown in Figure 5.13, for problem size 12, time reaches its
limit of tractability for C2-style.
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Figure 5.13: Performance evaluation of SAT4J Solver
Table 5.1: Comparative analysis among dierent SAT Solvers
S. No. SAT Solver Time (ms) No. of vars.
1. MiniSat 954 134304
2. MinisatProver 1386 134303
3. ZCha 895 134304
4. SAT4J 1050 134304
The Alloy Analyzer supports many SAT solvers such as MiniSat, MiniSat
with Unsat Core, ZCha, and SAT4J to exhaustively search for satisfying
models or counterexamples. The comparative analysis among these solvers
for problem size (scope) 7, maximum memory used 768M, maximum stack
used 8192k is presented in Table 5.1. Finally, the comparison of performance
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evaluation among these solvers is also presented in Figure 5.14 for problem size
2 to 10 with same system conguration.
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Figure 5.14: Performance evaluation among dierent SAT Solvers
There are many advantages of analyzing dierent levels of abstractions of
an architectural style such as internal functioning of component and connec-
tor, topology of architectural elements, and principle of the architectural style.
The rst advantage is to provide more understandability for developer to im-
plement dierent components and connectors. Second advantage is to provide
a framework that is helpful for deployment process. Third advantage provides
an appropriate level of granularity for accessing non-functional properties of a
software system. The use of formal modeling techniques ensures the correct-
ness of any architectural changes performed by an architect. In this study, it
is inferred that analysis of dynamic aspects of any style needs to be carried
out to assess the correctness.
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5.6 Conclusion
An architectural style has been characterized by their control-ow and data-
ow patterns, allocation of functionality across components, and connectors.
To select an architectural style for a software, it is a multi-criteria decision-
making problem in which dierent goals and objectives must be taken into
consideration. In this study, an architectural style C2 is considered for safety
critical system called as cruise control system. After designing CCS using C2,
it is modeled using formal modeling language Alloy. For consistency checking
among architectural elements such as, components, connectors, C2-connectors,
port and role Alloy Analyzer has been considered. Alloy Analyzer supports
many SAT solvers such as SAT4J, MiniSAT, MiniSATProver, and Zcha.
Hence it is necessary to evaluate the performance of each one. From the above
study, it is concluded that, formalizing an architectural style provides style
consistency and validity of conguration. It also helps in renement of critical
processes and checking compatibility among dierent style.
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Conclusions
In order to prove the correctness of the system requirements, there are large
number of verication techniques available such as reachability analysis, static
code analysis, formal equivalence checking, property specication language, au-
tomated theorem proving, and model checking etc. In this thesis, automated
theorem proving and model checking techniques have been considered for veri-
cation of behavioral model and an architectural style i.e., C2. In reachability
analysis technique, intended functions are proved during a specied time under
given conditions. Model checking analyzes all possible states of a system in a
brute-force manner. Since exhaustive testing of any software is not practically
possible, formal verication techniques are used because these techniques are
based on the exhaustive state space explosion of nite state machine. The use
of formal methods in the area of the verication and validation helps to build
a platform for development of software and hardware systems by proving the
completeness and correctness of models.
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6.1 Formalization of Behavioral Model
The use of formal methods in the area of verication and validation gives a
platform for analysis of software and hardware development and checking the
completeness as well as correctness of modeling. In the rst proposed work,
behavioral model of ATM system is modeled using four formal specication
languages such as Z, B, Alloy, and Monterey Phoenix. Subsequently this re-
search focuses on extracting signicant information about the eectiveness and
weakness in the analysis phase by the use of these formal modeling languages
as well as the tools supported by these formal languages. Formal methods are
cost eective techniques which are used to reduce the fault rate of the desired
software.
6.2 Model Checking of a Complex Architec-
tural Style C2
In the second proposed work, a case study on analysis of safety critical system
called as, cruise control system using a complex architectural style C2 is pre-
sented. Subsequently a library of styles is presented using formal modeling lan-
guage Alloy to assist the reuse and extensible modeling of complex and highly
distributed components, developed in dierent programming languages. Com-
patibility among components, connectors, and C2-connectors has been checked
using model generator Alloy Analyzer. Finally, performance evaluation among
dierent SAT solvers have been performed in order to assess the eciency of
Alloy Analyzer. In this study, Alloy is chosen because it provides a compact
model that allows the verication of structural and behavioral properties of a
system. Modeling the structural properties of an architectural style has gen-
erally been associated with the component-connector abstractions. Styles are
generally considered to promote design reuse, code reuse, and support interop-
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erability between two dierent styles. Hence, it is concluded that, formalizing
an architectural style provides the proof for style consistency and validity of
conguration. It also helps in the renement of critical processes and checking
compatibility among dierent styles.
6.3 Scope for Further Research
Future work of this research may be proposed to extend the application of dif-
ferent models in complex styles on software architecture such as CORBA (Com-
mon Object Request Broker Architecture), and REST (REpresentational State
Transfer) architecture. The formal models can be veried using model check-
ers such as Alloy Analyzer, CPN Tools, and PAT (Process Analysis Toolkit).
The verication process will be carried out by considering dierent architec-
tural patterns such as state-logic-display, Model-View-Controller (well known
as MVC pattern), and Sense-Compute-Control etc.
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